NATUREZA HUMANA E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES PARA A LIBERDADE E IMPUTAÇÃO EM IMMANUEL KANT

Abstract

Reconciling conditions determined by nature with freedom has established itself as one of the great classic problems of philosophy. In this horizon, the present research proposes to explore the way that Immanuel Kant articulates the concepts of human nature and freedom within his ethical system, starting from the natural conditions that help or hinder the possibility of moral action and focusing on the problem of weakness of will. For this purpose, the criteria used by the German philosopher to classify someone as good or bad will be discussed, emphasizing the freedom and responsibility present in each particular action, even the worst, possible thanks to the performance of a moral conscience. When debating this subject, focusing on the first degree of propensity for evil, we will also present, in terms of contextualization and important peripheral discussions, the three degrees of disposition for good and propensity for evil, discussing these last three in more detail. In the first degree, it will be argued that there is coherence in thinking about Allison's incorporation thesis with the problem of moral weakness, considering an incorporation of an evil maxim. In the second, thematized by impurity, we will seek to think about the supposed contradiction that exists in Kant's system, when sometimes it is argued in favor of sympathetic feelings, sometimes it is rejected vehemently, it will also aim to reflect on the complications imposed by the limitation epistemological approach to morality, which closes the value of an action as inscrutable. As for malignancy - the third degree -, the limit of evil will be discussed, in view of Kant's argument that no one desires evil for evil's sake.