Modelo matemático para planejamento da atracação de navios de granel considerando o cálculo de prêmio e multa

Abstract

The growth of world demand for products with ever-lower costs is directly related to the acquisition of raw materials, regardless of where they are offered, but with the lowest final cost possible in order to enable the competitiveness of businesses around the world, including Brazil. In this scenario, almost all traders of the world use maritime transport, and to transport these raw materials, ports are becoming more required since the increased representation of logistics costs in the total cost of the products. Bulk cargo ships are usually contracted under the Charter Party contract between the owner and the shipper and establish a time limit for vessel to stay at port. If the vessel is below this time the shipper receives a financial award and, if not, pay a fine to the owner. After the literature review, no articles were found on the Berth Allocation Problem (BAP) that addressed the issues related to premium and fine from the perspective of Charter Party contract in order to maximize the financial result of the shipper, calculated as a reward less fine. Thus, a mathematical model is proposed for the BAP with consideration of the Charter Party, and instances based in the Port of Tubarão were developed and implemented in CPLEX 12.6. The results showed the applicability of the model in the scheduling of ships and also guidelines to support the negotiation of this type of contract.